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Abstract
Disputes on the foundations of Quantum Mechanics often involve the con-
ception of reality, without a clear definition on which aspect of this broad
concept of reality one refers. We provide an overview of conceptions of
reality in classical physics, in philosophy of science and in Quantum Me-
chanics and its interpretations and analyse their differences and subtleties.
Structural realism as conception in philosophy of science will turn out to
be a promising candidate to settle old problems regarding the conception
of reality in Quantum Mechanics. We amend the analysis of three main in-
terpretations and their relation to structural realism by three well-known
informational approaches in the interpretations of Quantum Mechanics.
Last we propose an additional class of structural realism supported by
QBism.
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1 Introduction
Quantum Mechanics is one of the most successful physical theories; still, its
interpretation and implications are a matter of dispute. One conception that is
at the very heart of the debates is the conception of reality. Realism is a broad
conception in philosophy of science; therefore, the term reality is inherently am-
biguous.
Reality represents a variety of conceptions[Sankey, 2008]. Disputes on the foun-
dations of Quantum Mechanics often involve the conception of reality, without
a clear definition on which aspect of this broad conception of reality one refers.
The scope of this work is to give an overview on the conceptions of reality
present in the EPR argument, Bells inequality and the interpretations of Quan-
tum Mechanics.
The development of the theory of relativity was accompanied by the advent of
positivistic philosophy, which strongly influenced the development of Quantum
Mechanics. Since the theory of relativity strongly followed Empiricism, which
asserts that only what is measurable can be seen as real, this stance was adopted
by most of the founding fathers of Quantum Mechanics. Not all of them wel-
comed the anti-realist philosophy that pervaded the early years of Quantum
Mechanics. Einstein and Schro¨dinger were strong opponents on the realist-side
to Bohr, Heisenberg and Pauli, who advanced the anti-realist position. An
overview on this famous debate is provided by [Landsman, 2006].
What the Einstein-Bohr debate initialised was an ongoing struggle on the very
nature of reality. After a brief outline of the realist accounts in classical physics
and philosophy of science we present the definitions of this disputed realities
and their involvement in the EPR argument, the Bell inequality and the mea-
surement process.
We amend a the presentation of [Esfeld, 2013] on the relation of structural
realism and Quantum Mechanics, by three more interpretations of Quantum
Mechanics that involve the concept of information and provide candidates for
the structures proposed by structural realism.
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2 Reality in classical physics
Reality is a broad conception, so we want to provide an overview on its aspects
as well as its presumptions and clarify its definitions for the conceptual use of
reality. Since the conception of reality will change vastly in Quantum Mechanics,
first we want to provide an overview on aspects of classical realism, which are
relevant to our discussion on reality in Quantum Mechanics. As [Braver, 2007,
p.14] points out realism in not always defined in a straightforward way:
“Of course, there are as many species of realism as there are kinds
of objects, since realism can be type-specific or ”local” rather than
”global”: one can be a realist about stars but not about the occurrence
of the sequence ”7777” in pi; a realist about the past, but not about
the future; a realist about unobserved, but not unobservables; or the
reverse for each pair.”
One could have the impression that ”reality” is a far too broad conception
to give a clear definition. [Gallie, 1955] provided a framework for terms that
represent such a broad conception, the idea of Essentially Contested Concepts:
“I shall try to show that there are disputes, centred on the concepts
which I have just mentioned, which are perfectly genuine: which,
although not resolvable by argument of any kind, are nevertheless
sustained by perfectly respectable arguments and evidence. This is
what I mean by saying that there are concepts which are essentially
contested, concepts the proper use of which inevitably involves end-
less disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users.”
Essentially Contested Concepts usually refer to sociopolitical terms such as
”democracy” and ”freedom,” but the term ”reality” with its variety of inter-
pretations gives the impression of being a good candidate for an Essentially
Contested Concept. We will not examine in detail if ”reality” conforms to the
conditions of Essentially Contested Concepts, but want to adopt the spirit of
the discussion on Essentially Contested Concepts for our examination of the
term reality.
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2.1 The structure of a physical theory and its metaphysics
We proposed a classification scheme to illustrate the formal, conceptual and
ontological differences between various interpretations of Quantum Mechanics
[Krizek, 2017a]. A visualization of the scheme shows the assignment of the
different elements of a theory and the related metaphysics.
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Mathematical laws
between mathematical symbols
Physics
2
Interpretation physical quantities
Relation physical quantities - Measurements
Measurement laws
3
Theoretical terms
Concepts and principles
4
Ontology - beables -
elements of reality
Metaphysics
Table 1: The Classification scheme and its application
On the mathematical level only mathematical symbols and their interrelation
are introduced.
On level two of the classification scheme, names f or the symbolically represented
quantities are assigned. This is the introduction of the basis of a theoretical
term. The full framework of theoretical terms is given by conceptual level three
of the classification scheme. It contains principles and conceptions. Theoretical
terms are fully defined on that level. An overview on the philosophical problems
of theoretical terms is provided by [Andreas, 2016].
In the framework of the evolution of physical theories, the question on the status
of theoretical terms arises again. Theoretical terms in several theories might be
represented by the same semantical term, but the meaning might differ vastly
as emphasized by [Esfeld, 2008, p.30]:
“Der Wechsel von einer alten zu einer neuen Theorie kann derart
schwerwiegend sein, dass die inferentiellen Beziehungen, die den In-
halt der charakteristischen Begriffe der beiden Theorien definieren,
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sich so radikal a¨ndern, dass die charakteristischen Begriffe der alten
Theorie nicht in den charakteristischen Begriffen der neuen Theorie
formuliert werden ko¨nnen. Es gibt kein gemeinsames Maß fu¨r die
charakteristischen Begriffe beider Theorien.”
“The change from an old to a new theory can be radical in that
sense, that the inferential relations, which define the content of the
characteristic terms of booth theories, change radically in a way that
the characteristic terms of the old theory cannot be formulated in
words of the characteristic terms of the new theory. There is no
common measure for the characteristic terms of both theories.1”
This concept is called Incommensurability and has been introduced by [Kuhn,
1962] and [Feyerabend, 1993]. In Quantum Mechanics the term ”particle” does
not have the same conceptual and ontological meaning as in classical particle
mechanics.
Detailed accounts on the historical debates on the structure of scientific theories
are provided by [Suppe, 1977], [Sneed, 1976], Ludwig [1978] and [Ludwig and
Thurler, 2007].
Following this brief overview on the structure of physical theories we provide a
list of conceptions that contribute to the conception of classical realism.
2.2 Uniqueness
In classical physics we refer to old principles that build the very basis of scien-
tific endeavour. This basis has been set by the Greek philosophers, especially
Aristotle, who provided a logical system and a philosophy of nature.
Two of these basic principles influence our scientific thinking in a fundamental
way: The contradiction principle and the Law of the Excluded Middle.
The contradiction principle is formulated in the following way [Ross, 1928]:
“It is, that the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and
not belong to the same subject and in the same respect.”
The contradiction principle can be seen as logical rule, as epistemological, or
ontological rule. In that sense, it refers to different regimes of scientific thinking.
Depending on the method of interpreting Aristotles contradiction principle, it is
related to a different level of the classification scheme we presented in [Krizek,
2017a]. The scheme consists of four levels that represent the structure of a
scientific theory: The mathematical formalism, the assignment to measurement
1Translation by the author.
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values and theory-terms, the conceptual structure, and the ontology of the the-
ory.
The logical contradiction principle would refer to the mathematical formalism
on level one, the epistemological2 contradiction principle would refer to the level
three of conceptions and principles of a theory, and the ontological contradiction
principle would refer to the level four of the classification scheme.
In a formal way the contradiction principle is given by the statement on any
statement p:
¬(p ∧ ¬p) (1)
The law of the excluded middle states that between a statement p and its nega-
tion ¬p there is nothing in between. Therefore, in a formal way, the law of the
excluded middle is given by
p ∨ ¬p (2)
These logical principles follow a priori from our common sense experience that
objects are here or there, from the behaviour we observe in nature. This a priori
knowledge influenced our thinking and the scientific method tremendously. So
the state of existence of an ontological object is thought as unique, as unam-
biguous. This uniqueness is one essential basis of classical reality.
Quantum Mechanics with superposition, entanglement and non-classical statis-
tics challenged this view on the ontological level. Some interpretations, such as
the Quantum logic approache challenged also the mathematical formalism and
questioned the classical logical structure [Mittelstaedt, 1978].
2.3 Independence
In classical physics, the conception of reality is independent of us, the human
beings as observers. Reality was and will be there, independent if we describe it
or not [Sankey, 2008, p.15ff]. And the term ”description” gives a good picture
of the idea behind independence in this context. A description is the process
of observation without altering the observed. It describes some reality that is
there in a language, or another formal way. This independence will be realised
within the definition of metaphysical realism in philosophy of science.
2Since the epistomological application is the one which is not straightforward, we want
to give an example: In a political system like democracy, people are seen equal by principle.
All citizens are allowed to elect. All non-citizens are not allowed to elect. Though we know
that the individuals are not equal on an ontological level, in the conception of democracy an
epistemological equality is adopted, which gives no implication to the ontological level for the
individual human.
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2.4 Completeness and correspondence
Directly related to the notion of independence is the conception of correspon-
dence and completeness. The idea of correspondence is that the scientific theo-
ries and their content corresponds to something out there. We observe phenom-
ena and describe them with the formal language of mathematics and a semantic
structure of terms and statements. It is one assumption of realism that this
formal and semantic structure corresponds to a reality that is the causation of
the observed phenomena [Putnam, 1981] and [Hilary, 1988].
The correspondence between reality and the formal and semantic description
of the theory can involve different levels of the theory structure. We allude
to the classification scheme and can distinguish pure mathematical correspon-
dence and a conceptual correspondence. In a mathematical correspondence, the
elements of the mathematical formalism of the theory correspond to elements
on the ontological level. In the conceptual correspondence, concepts are corre-
sponding to elements on the ontological level.
We provided a definition of different conceptions of completeness in [Krizek,
2017b, p.26ff]. We summarize these conceptions of completeness and their re-
lation to reality:
Theory completeness:
Definition 1. A theory fulfills theory completeness if its physical quantities
and laws are connected by concepts that only relate only to each other and the
theory renounces extra assumptions of concepts, which exceed the framework of
the theory.
Bijective completeness:
Definition 2. Bijective completeness means that every element of the physical
reality i must have a counterpart ti in the physical theory.
Born completeness:
Definition 3. Born completeness for a theory is fulfilled if the theory contains
no probabilistic elements. A theory which contains statistical accounts and prob-
abilistic statements is considered to be incomplete.
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Schro¨dinger completeness:
Definition 4. Schro¨dinger completeness for a theory is fulfilled if the theory
contains probabilistic statements about elements of the theory. The probabilistic
statements refer not to the statistical ensemble of many events, but to one single
event. The probabilistic statements are fundamental in the sense that nothing
more can be said about the system. The theory is considered to be incomplete if
there are potential new elements3 in the theory that would abandon the proba-
bilistic character of the theory.
ψ - completeness:
“An ontological model is ψ-complete if the ontic state space Λ is
isomorphic to the projective Hilbert space PH (the space of rays of
Hilbert space) and if every preparation procedure Pψ associated in
quantum theory with a given ray ψ is associated in the ontological
model with a Dirac delta function centered at the ontic state Λ that
is isomorphic to Ψ, p(λ|Pψ) = δ(λ− λψ).”
The conception of completeness is deeply related to the conception of reality,
since in a classical picture reality is mapped by correspondence rules to a phys-
ical theory. Since we expect this theory to describe the whole phenomena we
consider it to be complete in the sense of theory completeness and by bijective
completeness we expect it to map the whole of reality.
We conclude that bijective completeness is an inherent property of the concep-
tion of a classical realism. Theory completeness motivates the aim for a theory
of everything which is fully complete in the sense of theory completeness, and
by bijective completeness explores and defines all branches of reality.
3Einstein calls them ”fremde Faktoren”(external factors). The translation of ”fremde” is
peculiar, since in the literally translation it would be ”strange,” ”weird,” ”alien” or ”different,”
but in context it refers to factors that are not considered in the theory. They are not part
of the theory, so we decided to use external. In our modern context, these factors could be
understood as ”hidden variables.”
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3 Reality in contemporary philosophy of science
A thorough discussion on reality in philosophy of science would go beyond the
scope of this work, so we confine our presentation to conceptions that are al-
ready related to the debates on the interpretations of Quantum Mechanics. We
also omit the historical development, since nearly every philosophical attitude
advocated a position towards reality.
3.1 Metaphysical realism
Metaphysical realism is the position that the world exists independently of us,
our knowledge about the world and our perception of it.
We define a set of elements of reality PR.
PR = {i} = {A, B , C} (3)
Definition 5. The world ensues Metaphysical realism if there exist ontological
entities i we name elements of reality.
The position of metaphysical realism is controversial and faces a lot of challenges,
mainly based on the representation problem, which questions the connection be-
tween our beliefs and the independently existing entities in the world. The repre-
sentation problem is the main attack line for criticism from anti-realists. There
are several anti-realist positions that differ vastly, but their common ground is
the rejection of the basic assumption of metaphysical realism; the existence of
a world independent of our perception and beliefs.
Metaphysical realism is an assumption prior to any statement on the connec-
tion to the structure of scientific theories. That is also the basic difference
between metaphysical realism and scientific realism; the latter one already in-
volves statements and positions towards the structure of our scientific enterprise.
Metaphysical realism does not imply scientific realism [Khlentzos, 2016]:
“That the worlds constituents exist mind-independently does not en-
tail that its constituents are as science portrays them. One could
adopt an instrumentalist attitude toward the theoretical entities posited
by science, continuing to believe that whatever entities the world ac-
tually does contain exist independently of our conceptions and per-
ceptions of them.”
Putnam advances a position of internalist perspective of metaphysical realism
and presents the externalist perspective in a brief way [Putnam, 1981, p.48]:
“One of these perspectives is the perspective of metaphysical real-
ism. On this perspective, the world consists of some fixed totality of
mind-independent objects. There is exactly one true and complete
description of ’the way the world is’. Truth involves some sort of
9
correspondence relation between words or thought-signs and external
things and sets of things. I shall call this perspective the externalist
perspective, because its favorite point of view is a God’s Eye point of
view.”
Figure 1: Externalist metaphysical realism in the classification scheme
It is noteable that Putnam in his presentation of the externalist view amends
the basic assumption of metaphysical realism with the assumption of Bijective
completeness4
Additional to the set of elements of reality PR we define a set of elements of a
theory TPR.
TPR = {ti} = {A,B,C} (4)
Definition 6. The world ensues the externalist perspective of Metaphysical re-
alism if there exist ontological entities i we name elements of reality and there
is one mapping φ that provides a bijection from every element i to ti.
Putnam clearly rejects this externalist view of metaphysical realism and ad-
vances a different position [Putnam, 1981, p.49-50]:
“I shall refer to it as the internalist perspective, because it is charac-
teristic of this view to hold that what objects does the world consist
off is a question that it only makes sense to ask within a theory
or description. Many ’internalist’ philosophers, though not all, hold
further that there is more than one ’true’ theory or description of the
world. ’Truth’, in an internalist view, is some sort of (idealized) ra-
tional acceptability - some sort of ideal coherence of our beliefs with
each other and with our experiences as those experiences are them-
selves represented in our belief system - and not correspondence with
mind-independent or discourse-independent ’states of affairs’.”
4See definition 2.
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The internalist perspective advances the view that there is a metaphysical re-
ality, but it is only possible only to conclude from the internal perspective of a
theory to the nature of the elements of reality. In the internalist perspective,
there is not one true and complete description of the world; there are proba-
bly more and even equally true descriptions that provide different mappings to
the elements of reality. Therefore, we define the internalist perspective as the
following:
Definition 7. The world ensues the internalist perspective of Metaphysical re-
alism if there exists ontological entities i we name elements of reality but there
is no single mapping φ that provides a bijection from every element i to ti.
There exist several sets TPR−k and corresponding mappings φk from set TPR−k
to PRk.
The assumption of metaphysical realism amended with statements on the struc-
ture of scientific theories represents the conception of scientific realism.
3.2 Scientific realism
Scientific realism is based on metaphysical realism. There are several accounts
on scientific realism, and we cannot provide a comprehensive overview of the
field. We will follow the position of [Esfeld, 2008]:
‘Eine metaphysische Behauptung: Die Existenz und die Beschaffen-
heit der Welt sind unabha¨ngig von den wissenschaftlichen Theorien.
...
Eine semantische Behauptung: Die Beschaffenheit der Welt legt fest
welche der wissenschaftlichen Theorien wahr sind (und welche nicht
wahr sind).
...
Eine epistemische Behauptung: Die Wissenschaften sind im Prinzip
in der Lage, uns einen kognitiven Zugang zur Beschaffenheit der
Welt zu gewa¨hren.”
“A metaphyiscal proposition: The existence and the nature of the
world is independent of scientific theories.
...
A semantic proposition: The nature of the world determines which
scientific theories are true (and which are not).
...
An epistemic proposition: Science empowers us to have cognitive
access to the nature of the world5.”
The first proposition is an addendum to the assumption of metaphysical realism,
it is based on the existence of metaphysical realism and demands that scientific
5Translation by the author.
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theories are independent of this nature of the world. The third proposition as-
sumes that by our best theories we gain access to the metaphysical nature of
the world, to the elements of reality.
The conception of scientific realism itself is also a matter of discussion to which
we cannot refer in detail in this presentation. An overview on contrasting posi-
tions in this question is provided by [Ellis, 2005], [Esfeld, 2008], [Psillos, 2005]
and [Sankey, 2008].
A contrasting position to scientific realism is the position of Instrumentalism
[Sankey, 2008, p.14]:
“Instrumentalism denies the literal interpretation of theoretical dis-
course, treating it instead as fictional discourse.”
According to instrumentalism it is the aim of science to describe phenomena in a
model. Every statement on metaphysical and specifically unobservable entities
is superfluous in the framework of science. An instrumentalist’s account on
Quantum Mechanics is provided by [Englert, 2013]:
“Quantum theory has its interpretation and does not need a philo-
sophical Uberbau. Of course, philosophers should be encouraged to
study the lessons of quantum theory for example, the lesson that
the future is not predetermined by the past but their philosophical
debates are really irrelevant for quantum theory as a physical theory,
although they are likely to be of great interest to physicists. We could
leave it at that, were there not the widespread habit of the debaters to
endow the mathematical symbols of the formalism with more mean-
ing than they have.”
The discussion on the definition and relevance of scientific realism raises the
question: If unobserved entities exist, what we can know about them? The
most prominent discussion on the existence of unobserved entities in physical
context is the atomic hypothesis: Do atoms exist? Or to be more precise: Is
the conception of an atom within the physical theory necessary? And secondly:
Does the conception of atoms imply that the existence of atoms as ontological
objects is necessary or at least reasonable?
These two questions refer to different levels, the first only to the conception of a
physical theory, the second to the ontological level according to the classification
scheme. The question of Atomism should be seen also in the light of the old
dichotomy between discrete and continuous.
An historical introduction to Atomism with emphasis on Einstein’s contribu-
tions is provided by [Kox, 2014], a review on the broader influences and impli-
cations of Atomism is provided by [Roecklein, 2015], and general introductions
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on Atomism are provided by [Chalmers, 2009] and [Chalmers, 2014].
The acceptance of atoms on the conceptual level was achieved relatively fast, the
conception was too successful in the sense of unification and predictive power
to be ignored. Therefore, the question arises: What are the principles that lead
to the acceptance of new conceptions or ontologies?
This question addresses the distinction between physics and metaphysics which
is a heavily disputed topic.[van Inwagen and Sullivan, 2017, Chapter 4] gives an
overview on the problem and its recent status of the discussion:
“One attractive strategy for answering these questions emphasizes
the continuity of metaphysics with science. On this conception,
metaphysics is primarily or exclusively concerned with developing
generalizations from our best-confirmed scientific theories. For ex-
ample, in the mid-twentieth century, Quine (1948) proposed that that
the old/intermediate metaphysical debate over the status of abstract
objects should be settled in this way. He observed that if our best sci-
entific theories are recast in the canonical notation of (first-order)
quantification ..., then many of these theories, if not all of them,
will have as a logical consequence the existential generalization on
a predicate F such that F is satisfied only by abstract objects. It
would seem, therefore, that our best scientific theories carry onto-
logical commitment to objects whose existence is denied by nominal-
ism.”
There is not one clarified and for all times fixed methodology to gain access to
the metaphysical nature of reality; it is more a freedom of methods, which also
was supported by [Feyerabend, 1993]. One ontological conception which was
both successful and comprehensible was the conception and ontology of objects.
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3.3 Object conception and ontology
The conception of objects is not a trivial one, but for our discussion the follow-
ing outline will be sufficient:
An object is an entity that has the ability to carry a set of properties and is
distinguished from other objects by this set of properties. It is circumscribed
from its environment.
These properties of objects are called intrinsic properties [Esfeld, 2007, p.7]:
“Intrinsic are all and only those properties that an object has irre-
spective of whether or not there are other contingent objects; in brief,
having or lacking an intrinsic property is independent of accompani-
ment or loneliness.”
Properties that are not of that kind are called extrinsic or relational properties.
They refer to relations to other objects.
This conception of objects is consistent with Einsteins view on physical objects
[Einstein, 1948]:
“It is further characteristic of these physical objects that they are
thought of as arranged in a space time continuum. An essential as-
pect of this arrangement of things in physics is that they lay claim, at
a certain time, to an existence independent of one another, provided
these objects are situated in different parts of space.”
Since in classical physics objects like particles, rigid bodies, etc. play an im-
portant role in the ontology of these theories, a specific conception of reality is
used, which is defined as Entity realism [Sankey, 2008, p.44]:
“Entity realism is therefore the doctrine that theoretical entities are
real in the sense that they exist mind-independently. This may be
expressed more simply as follows:
(ER) The theoretical entities postulated by science are real.”
Not all theoretical entities will be regarded as real in the sense of Entity realism.
It is a question of the structure of the theory, reason and practicability if a
theoretical entity is considered as real. Since objects turn out to be conceptions
in the best of our theories (within classical physics), it is reasonable to apply
Entity realism to the conception of objects and regard them as real on the
ontological level.
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There are some arguments against an object ontology that follow directly out of
the scientific progress in classical physics. At several states of classical physics
and philosophy of nature before, objects on the ontological level have been pro-
posed. During the progress of physics, these object ontologies have been aban-
doned or modified as long as physics arrived at atoms and elementary particles.
All object ontologies that have been adopted on this way, together with respec-
tive sets of properties, turned out to have no ontological character. Instead, the
properties assigned with those objects followed out further physical conceptions
that involved more fundamental ontologies. Applying the Pessimistic Meta In-
duction to this development process, the object ontology turns out to be not a
successful conception, though a helpful one. If object ontology fails on so many
levels in classical physics, Pessimistic Meta Induction confined to this question
questions why an object ontology should be applied to deeper levels. Would it
not be surprising if object ontology failed on all empirical accessible levels and
succeeds on the metaphysical level?
Object ontology is deeply related to materialism, since materialism emphasizes
the fundamental character of matter as the essential entity of which everything
is made. Materialism became challenged by theory of relativity and Atomism
which deconstructed the conception of matter as a substance, a process that is
continued by elementary particle physics even now.
The emphasis of objects in the conceptual and ontological level of our theories
also led to several problems in context with Quantum Mechanics as we will see
in Section 4. Since the object-conception and ontology is a dominant element
in physical theories, we want to present a conception in philosophy of science
that challenges the relevance of objects, the conception of structural realism.
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3.4 Structural realism
Structural realism is a conception in philosophy of science that goes back to
[Worrall, 1989], who provided a conception for the structure of theories and
the involved entities that differs vastly from the approaches in classical physics.
The main difference is the type of theoretical entity that structural realism
assigns reality to according to Entity realism. Structural realism emphasizes
”structure” as the primary ontological entity and reduces the relevance of the
entity ”object.”
[Worrall, 1989, p.153]:
“Scientific Realism of any stripe consists of a metaphysical thesis
conjoined with an epistemological one. The metaphysical thesis is
often taken as the claim that there exists a reality independent of the
human mind. But, as Elie Zahar points out, a more accurate ren-
dition in our more enlightened, post-Cartesian-dualism times would
be:
There exists a structured reality of which the mind is a part; and,
far from imposing their own order on things, our mental operations
are simply governed by the fixed laws which describe the workings of
Nature.”
and further:
“Not only is this structured reality partially accessible to human dis-
covery, it is reasonable to believe that the successful theories in ma-
ture science (the unified theories that explain the phenomena without
ad hoc assumptions) have indeed latched on, in some no doubt par-
tial and approximate way, to that structured reality, that they are, if
you like, approximately true.”
With the structural realism approach, Worrall attempted to strengthen scientific
realism, which had to face main criticism from the Underdetermination argu-
ment by [Laudan, 1981] and the Pessimistic Meta Induction by [Quine, 1951].
There are three positions of structural realism that can be distinguished, re-
garding their way of interpreting the Entity realism:
• Epistemic structural realism (ESR) is the position advocated by Worrall
emphasizing the structures as primary over objects, but assigning both
relevance on the ontological level.
• Radical Ontic structural realism (OSR) is the position introduced by [La-
dyman, 1998a], emphasizing structure, but neglecting objects as superflu-
ous, scrutinizing the metaphysical or epistemological aim of ESR.
• Moderate Ontic structural realism is the position advocated by [Esfeld
and Lam, 2008] putting structures and objects on the same ontological
basis. There are no relations without relata.
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A more detailed overview on the differences of these positions is provided by
[Ladyman, 2016], an analysis regarding the presented classification scheme and
the relation to other approaches of structures of scientific theories is provided
by [Krizek, 2017a]. Despite all subtleties ESR and OSR are distinguished by
these main positions [Ladyman, 2016]:
“A crude statement of ESR is the claim that all we know is the struc-
ture of the relations between things and not the things themselves,
and a corresponding crude statement of OSR is the claim that there
are no things and that structure is all there is (this is called radical
structuralism by van Fraassen 2006).”
Notwithstanding that object conceptions and ontologies played a crucial role
in the conception of classical physics, in Quantum Mechanics the conception of
objects becomes challenging and even dubious. We provide involved conceptions
of reality in Quantum Mechanics and revisit the relevance of structural realism
within Quantum Mechanics.
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4 Concepts of reality in Quantum Mechanics
The starting point for a new picture of reality is the new formal description
of Quantum Mechanics that emerged out of the old Quantum theory and its
peculiarities. The formal structure of Quantum Mechanics was different in the
sense of the involved framework. It was not defined in a R3 space or R1,3
Minkowski spacetime, it was formally defined on a Hilbert space, which has
infinite dimensions. The formal structure of states as vectors in a Hilbert space
allowed the possibility of superpositions.
... ERGNZEN die Problematik der Interpretation ...
With respect to that question, there are several conceptions of reality that are
provided.
4.1 Naive realism
Following the position of metaphysical realism presented in section 3.1 there is
a reality out there that causes the phenomena we observe. The view of naive
realism is that our observations not only resemble the truth about the causes of
the phenomena, even more our observations reveal the complete nature of these
causes.
In these paradigms observation is a reading off of properties that are out there
independently of our observations. Naive realism can involve realism about
quantities as numerical representations of the properties of the entities in nature.
Further, a naive realism about concepts is conceivable.
Figure 2: Naive realism
For a presentation of Einsteins naive realism refer to [Krizek, 2017b].
A form of naive realism that is in discussion in contemporary physics is the
Mathematical Universe Hypothesis [Tegmark, 2004]. It claims that all entities
on the ontological level are directly related to the mathematical formalism, and
even more are isomorphic to the mathematical formalism. In that sense, the
Mathematical Universe Hypothesis trivially explains the unreasonable effective-
ness of mathematics and proposed by[Wigner, 1960].
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Naive realism is a version of the externalist perspective of Metaphysical realism:
Definition 8. Naive realism is the externalist perspective of metaphysical re-
alism with either conceptual or mathematical elements of the theory being in
bijective completeness to ontological entities, the elements of reality.
Naive realism involves no conception on measurements; therefore, it is not iden-
tical to a noninvasive measurability, which will be discussed later.
4.2 Einsteins reality criterion
In the EPR paper [Einstein et al., 1935], Einstein presented a criterion for
elements of a theory to represent elements of reality. The reality criterion is a
methodological claim to identify elements of a theory that fulfil the requirement
of being in correspondence with elements of reality.
Einstein was aware of the metaphysical demarcation problem with physics. In
his letter to Schro¨dinger [von Meyenn, 2010, letter 206, p.537], Einstein admits:
“Die eigentliche Schwierigkeit liegt darin, daß die Physik eine Art
Metaphysik ist; Physik beschreibt Wirklichkeit. Aber wir wissen nicht,
was Wirklichkeit ist; wir kennen sie nur durch die physikalische
Beschreibung!”6
“The difficulty is due to that physics is a kind of metaphysics; physics
describes ”reality”. But we do not know what ”reality” is; we only
know it through the physical description!”
The reality criterion is defined by [Einstein et al., 1935] in the following way:
“If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with cer-
tainty (i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical
quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality correspond-
ing to this physical quantity.”
By definition of a probability measure P (ti) for the elements of the theory the
reality criterion can be formally expressed as:
∀ti ∈ TPR ∧ P (ti) = 1 : ∃i ∈ PR (5)
For Einstein the reality criterion has no deep ontological meaning or represents
a general methodological claim; therefore, he got rid of it in later versions of
the EPR argument. [Fine, 2009] claims that there are good reasons to believe
that the reality criterion was an idea of Podolsky, since it is also incompatible
with methodological aspects of Einsteins theory of relativity [Krizek, 2017b].
6Translation by the author
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4.3 Ruarks reality criterion
In a response to the EPR-paper, Ruark proposed a modification of the reality
criterion [Ruark, 1935, p.466]:
“This conclusion7 is directly opposed to the view held by many theo-
reticians, that a physical property of a given system has reality only
when it is actually measured, and that wave mechanics gives a faith-
ful and complete description of all that we can learn from measure-
ments. ... The reason8 is that the authors adopt a criterion of reality
different from the one just mentioned;”
And further:
“The conclusion drawn by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen is, that in
accordance with their criterion of reality, the quantities correspond-
ing to both P and Q possess reality; so that the wave description,
failing to yield both of them, is incomplete.”
According to Ruark, none of both quantities correspond to an element of reality
unless measured. This modified reality criterion resembles the position of Bohr,
but without any commitment to classicality of the measurement apparatus.
4.4 Local realism in the Bell inequalities
Bell proposed an inequality in [Bell, 1964] that demonstrates the incompatibil-
ity of Quantum Mechanics with a set of assumptions in classical physics. These
assumptions are locality and realism. We want to give a closer look to the defi-
nition of the latter one.
In its original intention Bell’s theorem should demonstrate that only non-local
hidden-variable theories like the De-Broglie-Bohm interpretation are not in con-
tradiction with Quantum Mechanics, and all local hidden variable theories are
ruled out, serving as an argument for the De-Broglie-Bohm interpretation [Bell,
1964]:
“... a hidden variable interpretation of elementary quantum theory
has been explicitly constructed. That particular interpretation has
indeed a grossly nonlocal structure. This is characteristic, according
to the result to be proved here, of any such theory which reproduces
exactly the quantum mechanical predictions.”
It is irony that Bell’s theorem later was used the other way around to argue
that hidden-variable theories are untenable, and only by admitting that the De-
Broglie-Bohm interpretation as a non-local hidden-variable theory, it was not
7The conclusion that the quantum-mechanical description of the physical reality is com-
plete.
8The reason for the divergence of conclusion.
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affected by Bell’s theorem.
Bell proposes the Bohm-version of the EPR argument with a pair of Spin- 12
particles in a singlet state [Bell, 1964]:
“Since we can predict in advance the result of measuring any chosen
component of ~σ2’ by previously measuring the same component of ~σ1
, it follows that the result of any such measurement must actually
be predetermined. Since the initial quantum mechanical wave func-
tion does not determine the result of an individual measurement, this
predetermination implies the possibility of a more complete specifi-
cation of the state. Let this more complete specification be effected
by means of parameters λ.”
The parameter λ is the hidden variable that affects the value of the Spin vectors.
In this classical model spin is assumed as a classical object property of the
particles [Bell, 1981, p.1]:
“Do we not simply infer that the particles have properties of some
kind, detected somehow by the magnets, chosen ala Bertlmann9 by-
the Source - differently for the two particles?”
Considering this, the conception of realism in Bell’s theorem can be defined as:
Definition 9. Bell realism is the conception that a Bell-realistic theory describes
objects with properties that are well-defined before the measurement process and
after it.
Since the EPR argument was in the first place a way to criticise the statisti-
cal character of Quantum Mechanics by isolating the systems on hand of the
principle of separability, Quantum Mechanics and, specifically the feature of
entanglement, turned out to disobey the principle of separability. Soon the
discussion on the EPR argument turned and separability was not longer an ar-
gument to isolate the measurement processes of the two constituents involved in
a singlet state. Even more separability and locality itself were challenged. The
only escape out of this situation from a classical realism perspective is to at-
tribute correlation properties to the entangled constituents of the system [Bell,
1981, p.3]:
“To avoid such action at a distance they have to attribute, to the
space-time regions in question, real properties in advance of obser-
vation, correlated properties, which predetermine the outcomes of
these particular observations. Since these real properties, fixed in
advance of observation, are not contained in quantum formalism,
that formalism for EPR is incomplete.”
9Bell here refers to the Bertlmann’s socks correlation as an example for a classical correla-
tion.
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What Bell’s theorem shows is that such an assignment of local pre-existing
properties to objects does not reproduce the results as obtained from Quantum
Mechanics. And the possibility to perform experiments to test if nature behaves
according to these local pre-existing properties or according to Quantum Me-
chanics excels the value of Bell’s theorem.
A huge number of experiments have been performed to test Bell’s theorem
and they convincingly demonstrated that nature behaves according to Quan-
tum Mechanics [Clauser et al., 1969],[Weihs et al., 1998]. There are a number
of loopholes in the conception of the experiments or the conception of Bell’s
theorem that could save local Bell-realistic theories. In the last decades, sev-
eral of them were closed, but a full loophoole-free experiment has not been done.
Concluding, we can say that Bell-realism is defined by the object character of
the quantum system carrying properties. In the classification scheme, this can
be illustrated in the following way.
In a Bell-realistic theory, there are elements of the theory on level one and level
two of the classification scheme. Corresponding to the elements of the theory,
there are objects as entities on the ontological level that carry properties.
Figure 3: Bell realism in the Classification scheme
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4.5 Reality in the measurement process
In Quantum Mechanics, the measurement postulate is needed to explain how
single eigenvalues arise out of the formalism, which describes a state gener-
ally in a superposition of several eigenfunctions and their according eigenvalues
[Von Neumann, 1955].
For classical physics, we want to propose a reality conception that describes the
measurement process in classical terms.
Definition 10. Naive Measurement Reality is the conception that on the onto-
logical level
a) objects exist,
b) that carry a set of properties,
c) whose values are independent of the measurement process.
The difference between Bell realism and Naive Measurement realism is the on-
tological commitment to the existence of objects of the latter one. Bell realism
does not involve such an assumption.
In the conception of Naive Measurement Reality, a measurement of the prop-
erty of an object means that the value of the property of the object remains
unaltered by the measurement process. The system that conducts the measure-
ment changes one of its properties by the measurement process in a way that its
value corresponds to or equals the value of the property of the measured system.
On the ontological level, the measured systems property is an element of the
theory and corresponds to an element of reality; together they fulfil bijective
completeness. By the measurement process, as explained above, one value of
the measuring system will become corresponding or equal to the property of
the measured system. By this measurement process, the property of the system
that conducts the measurement alters one of its elements of reality. After the
measurement, the measuring system will also fulfill bijective completeness.
The Naive Measurement realism proposes a noninvasive measurability, as the
system that has been measured remains in its state unaltered, and a correspond-
ing or equal value on the measurement apparatus evolves out of the measurement
process.
If we apply this conception to the measurement process and the mathemati-
cal formalism in Quantum Mechanics, several problems arise. [Gardner, 1972]
provides an analysis on the three positions of Bohr, Popper and Reichenbach
and their relation to the Kochen-Specker theorem. We provide an overview of
the reality conceptions in the picture of the classification scheme on these three
positions.
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4.5.1 The Bohr view
Despite all subtleties of Bohr’s view on Quantum Mechanics we want to discuss
his ideas on the conception of reality at hand of the measurement process. An
thorough overview on Bohr’s positions is provided by [Kragh, 2012].
In Bohr’s view, the measurement process is seen as a creation process, where by
an interaction of a microscopic system with a macroscopic system, an element
of reality for the microscopic system in the macroscopic regime is created.
In the formalism of Quantum Mechanics, the state of the microscopic system
can be written by a decomposition to eigenvectors and eigenstates regarding the
observable A:
|ψ〉 =
∑
i
ai |φi〉 (6)
A |φi〉 = ai |φi〉 (7)
The expectation value of A is given by
〈A〉 = 〈Ψ|A|Ψ〉 =
∑
i
ai| 〈ψ|φi〉 |2. (8)
Bohr’s view on Quantum Mechanics involves a discrimination between the mi-
croscopic world and the macroscopic world on the ontological level, though he
did not provide a criterion that gave a sharp distinction. In this view, Quantum
Mechanics describes the outcomes of interactions with the microscopic world.
A measurement process involves a classical apparatus with properties {ti} =
{M1,M2, ...,Mi} which has corresponding elements of reality {PR} = {1, 2, ..., i}.
Measuring the observable A will reduce the state vector according to the mea-
surement postulate to one of its eigenvectors.
|ψ〉 =
∑
i
ai |φi〉 =⇒ |ψ〉 = aj |φj〉 (9)
By this interaction with the classical measurement apparatus, one of the prop-
erties of the measurement apparatus will alter its value to the value of the
respective eigenvalue.
The microscopical system will be in the reduced state and a repetitive measure-
ment will repeat the measurement result. Therefore, it is seen as justified to
assign to the element of the theory aj an element of reality, and the elements of
reality obey bijective completeness.
In Bohr’s view, it is essential that we cannot speak about the nature of the
microscopic entities before there has been a measurement; unmeasured observ-
ables have no meaning. In that way Bohr argued in his reply against Einsteins
presuppositions in the EPR paper[Bohr, 1935].
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Definition 11. Bohr Reality is the conception that on the ontological level it
is meaningless to speak about entities of the microscopic regime. It is only
meaningful to speak about macroscopic entities.
Figure 4: Bohrs view of a measurement - before and after the measurement
4.5.2 Popper’s view
Popper’s view is distinguished from Bohr’s view by a few differences. The notion
of a microscopic and macroscopic world is not a core conception as in Bohr’s
view. To Popper, a quantum mechanical system always has to have properties
even before the measurement. In Popper’s view, there exists an element of real-
ity that cannot be assigned to one of the elements in the theory. It is more or less
attributed to the conception of the particle, but not accessible within the theory.
After the measurement, there is an element in the theory that corresponds to
an element of reality. In general, it will not be the same element of reality, since
the property might have changed.
What is essential to Popper, according to Gardener, is the assignment to values
before the measurement process [Gardner, 1972]:
“He simply wishes to claim that it is at least possible (i.e., consistent
with quantum theory) to maintain that unmeasured observables have
values. A realistic view need not to be subject to the same strictures
as an avowedly deterministic one.”
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And in more detail concerning the elements of the theory and the elements of
reality [Gardner, 1972]:
“Another way to state Popper’s view, taking cognisance of Kochen
and Specker, might run as follows. We must distinguish between (1)
quantitative properties (or physical magnitudes), such as spin, posi-
tion, etc., and (2) the corresponding observables which go under the
same names. A value of an observable is by definition the result of a
measurement of that observable or, equivalently, of the correspond-
ing quantitative property. When a quantitative property is measured,
its value always coincides with that of the corresponding observable.
However, at other times, the quantitative properties may have values
which they never have when measured because the algebraic structure
of the observables prevents the corresponding observables from hav-
ing those values.”
What is most disturbing in Popper’s view is that the assignment of the onto-
logical elements of reality changes during the measurement process in a way
that affects the nature of the correspondence between elements of the theory
level and ontological elements. This is not satisfying from the perspective of the
classification scheme.
Since Popper’s view failed to be accepted and in some sense could be seen as
a special case of the De Broglie-Bohm account, we will not provide an extra
definition for this conception of reality.
Figure 5: Popper’s view of a measurement - before and after the measurement
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4.5.3 Reichenbach’s view
The conception of Reichenbach is based on critique of the Copenhagen inter-
pretation of Quantum Mechanic. Reichenbach also refers to the completeness
argument by [Einstein et al., 1935], and a rejection of Bohr’s approach of mean-
inglessness of entities in the microscopical world [Reichenbach, 1944, p.22ff]:
“Although we should like to consider this Bohr-Heisenberg interpre-
tation as ultimately correct, it seems to us that this interpretation has
not been stated in a form which makes sufficiently clear its grounds
and its implications. In the form so far presented it leaves a feeling
of uneasiness to everyone who wants to consider physical theories
as complete descriptions of nature; the path towards this aim seems
either to be barred by rigorous rules forbidding us to ask questions of
a certain kind, or open only to vague pictures which have no claim
to be regarded as an adequate expression of reality.”
As a solution he offers a three-valued logic that in some sense obeys Bohr’s ideas
of undefined observables before the measurement. But in Reichenbach’s view,
this does not mean that it is impossible to speak about the ontological entities
of the theory [Reichenbach, 1944, p.43]:
“We have, therefore, good reasons to say that the language of quan-
tum mechanics is written in terms of a three-valued logic. We must
not forget, however, that the subject matter of a science, without the
addition of further qualifications, does not determine a particular
form of logic. Quantum mechanics can be constructed in the form
of a two-valued logic; this is demonstrated by the existence of ex-
haustive interpretations. Only when we introduce the postulate that
causal anomalies be not derivable are we obliged to turn to a three-
valued logic.”
The three-valued logic allows true, false, and indeterminate statements [Re-
ichenbach, 1944, p.148]:
“This conception is introduced by a definition concerning unobserved
entities differing from definition 110 with respect to the rule which
establishes the values existing before the measurement. This is the
following definition.”
“Definition 3. The value of an entity u measured in a situation s
means the value u existing after the measurement; before the mea-
surement, and thus in the situation s, the entity u has all its possible
values simultaneously.”
“By possible values we mean values which in the situation s can be
expected with a certain probability greater than to be the result of a
measurement.”
10Which defines basically a conception that resembles Naive measurement realism.
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By ”indeterminate,” Reichenbach means that in the picture of the classification
scheme that there are all possible entities in existence. Since Reichenbach speaks
explicitly about entities carrying values, he advanced a kind of mathematical
realism.
After the measurement, one of the entities values is selected by the measurement
postulate and the theory element aj is in correspondence to the element of reality
aj and fulfils bijective completeness.
Figure 6: Reichenbach’s view of a measurement - before and after the measure-
ment
Reichenbach’s ideas on a modification of logical presuppositions to give an
appropriate interpretation found its continuation in the Quantum Logic ap-
proaches [Mittelstaedt, 1978], the idea of many possible values that exist si-
multaneously resembles the Many-World approaches in the interpretation of
Quantum Mechanics.
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4.6 Structural realism in Quantum Mechanics
Already, [Worrall, 1989, p.123] recognized the implications of the structural
realism approach for Quantum Mechanics:
“Is there any reason why a similar structural realist attitude cannot
be adopted towards quantum mechanics? This view would be explic-
itly divorced from the classical metaphysical prejudices of Einstein:
that dynamical variables must always have sharp values and that all
physical events are fully determined by antecedent conditions. In-
stead the view would simply be that quantum mechanics does seem
to have latched onto the real structure of the universe, that all sorts
of phenomena exhibited by microsystems really do depend on the sys-
tems quantum state, which really does evolve and change in the way
quantum mechanics describes.”
Or in a more compact way [Worrall, 1989, p.123]:
“The structural realist simply asserts, in other words, that, in view of
the theorys enormous empirical success, the structure of the universe
is (probably) something like quantum mechanical.”
Referring to the ontological level, structural realism rejects the idea of Bohr
that statements and questions about the microscopical world are meaningless,
but structural realism advances a realist view far from naive realism, related to
scientific realism [Worrall, 1989, p.122]:
“The realist is forced to claim that quantum-mechanical states cannot
be taken as primitive, but must somehow be understood or reduced
to or defined in classical terms. But the structural realist at least
is committed to no such claim - indeed he explicitly disowns it. He
insists that it is a mistake to think that we can ever understand the
nature of the basic furniture of the universe.”
What is emphasized by structural realism is the primary role of relations instead
of a primary role of objects, but to which extent is a matter of dispute within
the structural realist movement. [Ladyman, 1998b] first suggested that the
position of [Worrall, 1989, p.123] is ambiguous and introduced a distinction in
epistemic and ontic structural realism, advancing the latter position. Worrals
epistemic structural realism position is settled in the conception of Conservatism
[Morganti, 2004, p.101]:
“... the proper interpretation of ESR is, I believe, exactly that ac-
cording to which we are rationally entitled to believe in some level of
preservation of structures (more or less faithfully representing real-
ity) in the history of science but, considering the uncertainty existing
at the level of our tentative ontological description of the universe,
we should be ’agnostic’ about what exists beyond those structures”
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In Worrals view the objects as entities connected by structures are part of the
structures, but not the primary ones. Ladymans positions is nowadays named
as radical ontic structural realism and characterised by its full rejection of the
concept of object entities, or individual entities [Ladyman, 1998b, p.422]:
“The demand for an individuals-based ontology may be criticised on
the grounds that it is the demand that the structure of the mind-
independent world be imaginable in terms of the categories of the
world of experience. Traditional realism should be replaced by an ac-
count that allows for a global relation between models and the world,
which can support the predictive success of theories, but which does
not supervene on the successful reference of theoretical terms to in-
dividual entities, or the truth of sentences involving them.”
Related to this radical ontic structural realism, there is a position of moderate
ontic structural realism advanced by [Esfeld and Lam, 2008] which is situated
somewhere in between ontic and epistemic structural realism. The difference
is again the ontological relevance of objects; to moderate structural realism,
objects are an on the same footing as structures, in the sense that there are
no relations without entities thate those relations refer to. In the context of
Quantum Mechanics, moderate structural realism takes the following position
[Esfeld, 2007, p.8]:
“Quantum physics can therefore be taken to suggest a metaphysics
of relations, known also as structural realism: insofar as quantum
physics is concerned, the fundamental physical properties consist in
certain relations instead of being intrinsic properties.”
Moderate structural realism on one hand emphasizes the primary role of re-
lations, but without abandoning the conception of objects in general [Esfeld,
2004, p.11]:
“The argument of this paper accepts that relations require things that
stand in the relations (although these things do not have to be in-
dividuals, and they need not have intrinsic properties) and regards
physical theories as referring to things.”
The merit of the radical OSR position following [Esfeld, 2013, p.29] is ...
“... the commitment to there being a certain sort of structures in
the domain of quantum physics instead of objects with an intrinsic
identity.”
What Esfeld means exactly is that out of the formalism of Quantum Mechan-
ics and its interpretation, and the framework of ontic structural realism, it is
conclusive that there are no objects with intrinsic properties on the ontological
level. What ontic structural realism is abandoning is the conception of objects
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as entities on the ontological level of the classification scheme, replacing it with
the notion of structures.
What goes beyond this insight, is the claim that OSR cannot solve the problem
without involving the interpretational positions of Quantum Mechanics [Esfeld,
2013, p.29]:
“OSR is not in the position to provide on its own an ontology for
QM, since it does not reply to the question of what implements the
structures that it poses.”
With this conclusion [Esfeld, 2013] presents an overview on three main candi-
dates for interpretations of Quantum Mechanics that provide ontological im-
plications: Many worlds interpretations, collapse interpretations, and hidden
variable interpretations. Each of these interpretations provides a different can-
didate for the structure in the ontic structural realism program, and thereby
completing OSR with an concrete structure ontology.
[Esfeld, 2013, p.26] refers to Maudlin and presents three propositions for the
measurment problem:
“1.A The wave-function of a system is complete, i.e. the wave-
function specifies(directly or indirectly) all of the physical properties
of a system.
1.B The wave-function always evolves in accord with a linear dy-
namical equation (e.g. the Schrdinger equation).
1.C Measurements of, e.g., the spin of an electron always (or at least
usually) have determinate outcomes, i.e., at the end of the measure-
ment the measuring device is either in a state which indicates spin
up (and not down) or spin down (and not up).”
The three main interpretations according to [Esfeld, 2013] all give up one of
these three propositions. Hidden variable interpretations give up 1A, collapse
interpretations give up 1B and many worlds-interpretations give up proposition
1C.
What is omitted in [Esfeld, 2013] are several other approaches in the interpre-
tations of Quantum Mechanics. We want to amend the presentation of [Esfeld,
2013] by three more interpretational approaches that emphasize the conceptions
of information and belief, but in completely different directions.
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4.6.1 De Broglie-Bohm interpretation
The De Broglie-Bohm interpretation is distinguished in essential aspects from
Bohmian mechanics in the reading of [Du¨rr and Teufel, 2009]. It is character-
ized by the view that the Schro¨dinger equation can be rewritten as a set of a
complex- and a real-valued equation and resembles a Hamilton-Jacobi equation
known from classical mechanics, supplemented by a term that has no corre-
spondence in classical physics, the Quantum potential. Proponents of the De
Broglie-Bohm interpretation emphasize neither the quasi-Newton character of
the equations nor a return to classical physics. Even more, they emphasize the
highly nonclassical character of the Quantum potential as an expression of a
completely different physics. Therefore, it shows a deep misunderstanding of
the De Broglie-Bohm interpretation if we follow the argumentation in [Esfeld,
2013, p.28]:
“In enquiring whether OSR can be applied to Bohms theory, let us
focus on the contemporary conceptualization of this theory known as
Bohmian mechanics, which abandons the quasi-Newtonian formula-
tion of the theory in terms of a quantum potential”
For Bohmian Mechanics, [Esfeld, 2013] identifies a candidate for the structure
of a structural realism as:
“it is a structure that takes all the particles as relata. In short,
on Bohmian mechanics, there is a structure of correlated particle
positions.”
In the De Broglie-Bohm interpretation this structure that takes all particle
positions as relata in a very natural way, directly out of the reinterpretation of
the Schro¨dinger equation, is the Quantum potential. For k particles it is defined
as
Q =
N∑
k=1
−~
2∇2kR
2mkR
. (10)
The Quantum potential depends on a differential operator applied to the real-
valued function R with the polar decomposition ψ = Rei
S
~ . The real-valued
function R depends in general on the position of all k particles:
R = R(~q1, ..., ~qk, t) (11)
Thereby, the De Broglie-Bohm interpretation also instantiates the structure for
a structural realist approach, but in the case of the hidden variable approach, in
a more transparent way, with an explicit mathematical object, than in Bohmian
mechanics.
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Proponents of the De Broglie-Bohm interpretation emphasize the Quantum po-
tential as an information potential, but with a different conception of informa-
tion than in other informational approaches in Quantum Mechanics [Holland,
1995, p.90]; [Bohm and Hiley, 1984, p.260]11.
It is information in the sense of in-formation12, not in the sense of knowledge of
a system perceiving its environment[Bohm et al., 1987, 9.327]:
“In this explanation of the quantum properties of the electron, the
notion of information plays a key role. Indeed it is helpful to ex-
tend this notation of information and introduce what could be called
active information. The basic idea of active information is that a
form having very little energy enters into and directs a much greater
energy. The activity of the latter is in this way given a form similar
to that of the smaller energy. It is therefore clear that the original
energy-form will inform (i.e. put form into) the activity of the larger
energy.”
In the picture of Maudlins propositions on the measurement problem, the De
Broglie-Bohm interpretation gives up the proposition 1A, in the sense that it
interprets the real-valued equation part of the Schro¨dinger equation as a Hamil-
ton Jacobi function and, as a consequence of this, an additional equation of
motion for the particle positions follows.
Proponents of the De Broglie-Bohm interpretation would identify active infor-
mation and its mathematical carrier, the Quantum potential, as the resource
that represents the structure that is requested by a structural realist approach.
11
It should be noted further that Bohm emphasized the preliminary character the Quantum
potential has to him[Bohm and Curd, 1981, p.102]:
“Nevertheless, we evidently cannot be satisfied with accepting such a potential
in a definitive theory. Rather, we should regard it as at best a schematic repre-
sentation of some plausible physical idea to which we hope to advance later, as
we develop the theory further.”
12This reading of in-formation refers to Aristotle’s formal cause.
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4.6.2 Brukner-Zeilinger interpretation
The Brukner-Zeilinger interpretation has been proposed as a foundational prin-
ciple to reconstruct Quantum Mechanics out of informational principles [Zeilinger,
1999].
For a presentation of the Brukner-Zeilinger interpretation refer to [Brukner and
Zeilinger, 1999]; [Brukner and Zeilinger, 2003]; [Kofler and Zeilinger, 2013] and
[Zeilinger, 1999]. For critical remarks refer to Timpson [2003]; Timpson [2013];
[Khrennikov, 2016] and [Khrennikov et al., 2012].
Following the ideas of the Brukner-Zeilinger interpretation, information is seen
as the fundamental entity on the ontological level.
[Zeilinger, 1999, p.642]:
“The most fundamental viewpoint here is that the quantum is a con-
sequence of what can be said about the world. Since what can be said
has to be expressed in propositions and since the most elementary
statement is a single proposition, quantization follows if the most
elementary system represents just a single proposition.”
By decomposition of complex systems into smaller and smaller parts one ends
up at systems where such a single proposition represents the whole information
content of the system. These type of systems are elementary systems according
to [Zeilinger, 1999, p.635].
[Zeilinger, 1999, p.635] emphasizes that this foundational postulate can be seen
in a rather instrumentalist view [Zeilinger, 1999, p.635]:
“I would like to underline that notions such as that a system “rep-
resents the truth value of a proposition or that it “carries one bit of
information only implies a statement concerning what can be said
about possible measurement results.”
To delimit this informational approach from subjective approaches like Qbism
[Fuchs and Stacey, 2016] or the Vxjo interpretation [Khrennikov et al., 2012],
Zeilinger emphasizes that information is not completely replacing the notion of
reality, but he enhances the ontological status of information [Zeilinger, 1999,
p.642]:
“It is evident that one of the immediate consequences is that in
physics we cannot talk about reality independent of what can be said
about reality. Likewise it does not make sense to reduce the task of
physics to just making subjective statements, because any statements
about the physical world must ultimately be subject to experiment.
Therefore, while in a classical world-view, reality is a primary con-
cept prior to and independent of observation with all its properties,
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in the emerging view of quantum mechanics the notions of reality
and of information are on an equal footing.”
Contrary to the previously mentioned subjective approaches, the Brukner-Zeilinger
interpretation makes use of the conception of a hypothetical observer to omit the
assignment of the quantum state to one specific observer. This inter-subjective
character of information and the description by Quantum Mechanics is empha-
sized by [Brukner, 2017, p.6]:
“The quantum state is a representation of knowledge necessary for
a hypothetical observer respecting her experimental capabilities to
compute probabilities of outcomes of all possible future experiments.”
In context of David Deutsch’s version of the Wigner’s friend Gedankenexperi-
ment, Brukner argues for the existence of facts only in a relative sense [Brukner,
2017, p.1]:
“The view that holds the coexistence of the facts of the world common
both for Wigner and his friend runs into the problem of the hidden
variable program. The solution lies in understanding that facts can
only exist relative to the observer.”
In that sense, reality and facts about the world are defined in a relational way
only. This is supported by structural realism, which would emphasize this re-
lational structure. Unclear remains the status of the quantum objects. The
Brukner-Zeilinger interpretation remains neutral on the ontological structure of
the objects on the quantum level, in a general sense, but it abandons the idea
of classical pre-existing properties above the informational content of the ele-
mentary systems.
It is this informational storage capacity of an elementary system and its con-
tained total information that is the candidate for a structure according to struc-
tural realist ideas. Entanglement, then, is the practical feature of quantum sys-
tems that share a structure of common or joint information.
One aspect of the Brukner-Zeilinger interpretation is the relation between the
definition of information and the ways humans process information, as pointed
out by [Khrennikov, 2016, p.8]:
“I think that to explain peculiarity of the quantum representation
of information one has to discuss the logical structure of informa-
tion processing by humans. Besides classical Boolean logic, there
exist various nonclassical logics, nonclassical rules for information
processing. ... Meanwhile, the brain may use more complex logical
systems. In particular, it may use quantum logic. Thus the quantum
representation of information is a mathematical signature of the use
of quantum logic in reasoning.”
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Despite the inter-subjective approach in the Brukner-Zeilinger interpretation,
Khrennikov emphasizes the subjective character of the whole process of in-
formation processing and the various definitions of logic. Contrary to the De
Broglie-Bohm interpretation, where information is understood as a formal cause,
information in the Brukner-Zeilinger interpretation is a still an entity that is re-
lated to observers, to humans.
4.6.3 QBism
A third approach which we want to relate to structural realism is QBism.
QBism, earlier an abbreviation for Quantum Bayesianism, now renamed to
Quantum Bettabilitarianism [Fuchs and Stacey, 2016], is a continuation of the
Copenhagen interpretation. It is a reconstruction of Quantum Mechanics that
emphasizes the subjective character of Quantum Mechanics, or merely the mix-
ture of subjective and objective elements in one formalism. According to the
proponents of QBism, this mixture is the source of the difficulties with the
interpretation of the formalism of Quantum Mechanics [Fuchs, 2017, p.8]:
“The starting point was, along with Jaynes, that the objective could
never reside in the probabilities themselves; that was for the subjec-
tive. The objective must be somewhere else in the theory.”
A reconstruction of Quantum Mechanics based on SIC-POVMs, which are sym-
metric, informationally complete, positive operator-valued measures, is pro-
posed to decompose the mixture of subjective and objective elements into a
different formalism that emphasizes the probabilistic and subjective character
of an agent interacting with nature. QBism speaks also about objective el-
ements, which are identified as the Hilbert space dimension of the quantum
systems [Fuchs and Stacey, 2016, p.47]:
“Quantum theory—that user’s manual for decision-making agents
immersed in a world of some yet to be fully identified character
makes a statement about the world to the extent that it identifies a
quality common to all the world’s pieces. QBism says the quantum
state is not one of those qualities. But of Hilbert spaces themselves,
particularly their distinguishing characteristic one from the other,
dimension,... QBism carries no such grudge. Dimension is some-
thing one posits for a body or a piece of the world, much like one
posits a mass for it in the Newtonian theory. Dimension is some-
thing a body holds all by itself, regardless of what an agent thinks of
it.”
QBism and the Brukner-Zeilinger interpretation agree in the emphasis of the
significance of the Hilbert space dimension, but disagree on the interpretation
of the very nature of this characteristic. Brukner and Zeilinger assign the con-
ception of information to the elementary system, whereas QBism speaks more
generally of a capacity [Fuchs and Stacey, 2016, p.48]:
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“The claim here is that quantum mechanics, when it came into exis-
tence, implicitly recognized a previously unnoticed capacity inherent
in all matter call it quantum dimension.”
By the emphasis of the Hilbert space dimension, QBism follows an old methodol-
ogy of philosophy and physics equally; the methodology of identifying invariants
as foundational and ontological entities. This invariant is the Hilbert space di-
mension or quantum dimension of a quantum system.
Following the classification of [Cabello, 2015] on interpretations of Quantum
Mechanics, QBism is classified as a Type II interpretation on belief. If we want
to relate QBism to structural realism, neither ontic structural realism, nor epis-
temic structural realism seems suitable to represent the position of QBism, since
both structural realist positions do not consider the subjective perspective of
an agent in the world as emphasized by QBism.
Therefore we propose QBism as a different form of structural realism, a doxastic
structural realism. Doxastic is derived from the greek word doxa, which stands
for ”belief”, and reflects the distinction from epistemic and ontological commit-
ments. The structures of this doxastic structural realism, that is represented
by QBism, are the mutually beliefs of agents performing Quantum Mechanics.
The structures identified by QBism are not objective, since they represent an
internalist view of the beliefs on the behaviour of nature of one specific agent
in interaction with nature.
The Qbist position also alters the definition of physics its purpose [Fuchs and
Stacey, 2016, p.47]:
“What is being realized through QBism’s peculiar way of looking at
things is that physics actually can be done without any accompany-
ing vicious abstractionism. You do physics as you have always done
it, but you throw away the idea everything is made of [Essence X]”
before even starting. Physics in the right mindset is not about iden-
tifying the bricks with which nature is made, but about identifying
what is common to the largest range of phenomena it can get its
hands on.”
So besides the subjective beliefs of agents, QBism identifies the quantum dimen-
sion as some objective structure that can be identified as common to a large
range of phenomena. In our view this property reflects some aspect of the na-
ture of the universe.
The identification of the quantum dimension as a capacity or resource entails
consequences. One has to deal with infinite dimensional Hilbert spaces. [Fuchs
and Stacey, 2016, p.52] speculate that the quantum dimension should be finite
in general:
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“To make quantum dimension meaningful in ontic terms, as a qual-
ity common to all physical objects, is to say it should be finite - going
up, going down from this object to the next, but always finite. Every
region of space where electromagnetism can propagate, finite. Every
region of space where there is a gravitational ”field,” finite.”
Space takes a exceptional position under all degrees of freedom in Quantum
Mechanics and presumably the solution to this conundrum lies beyond Quan-
tum Mechanics. By means of different interpretations this exceptional status
of space can be seen as well. Using the example of Bohmian Mechanics in the
reading of moderate structural realism, the position of a particle remains the
only intrinsic property left13. All other properties turn out to be relational and
support the idea of an abandoning of the object-character of quantum systems.
4.7 Quambiguity
In [Krizek, 2017c], we presented a quality of Quantum Mechanics that reflects
the ambiguity in the ontological commitments that the different interpretations
of Quantum Mechanics imply. To reflect this ambiguous character of Quantum
Mechanics, we coined the term ”Quambiguity”.
It has been shown by [Quine, 1951] and others that there is an underdetermina-
tion of science in general, but specifically in Quantum Mechanics it seems that
this underdetermination is raised to a new level. Quantum Mechanics allows
a variety of interpretations that advance completely orthogonal ontologies. Is
this ”Qambiguity” a feature of the formalism, and therefore a question of the
representation of the empirical facts? Or, on the other hand, does ”Quambigu-
ity” give an insight into the ontological structure of the world beyond Quantum
Mechanics, and what is the conclusion if it is possible to involve such a vari-
ety of ontological conceptions with one formalism and one set of empirical facts?
We cannot give an answer on these serious questions, but we can give some con-
jectures. It seems possible again to take a realist and anti-realist position on the
question on the nature and reason for Quambiguity. A anti-realist position could
be to assert that the ambiguity in the ontological commitment is an indicator
for the redundancy of any ontological commitment. This could be the position
of a radical Empiricism, or some related view. A realist position could be to
question the nature of ontological entities that we rely on. Usually, realism is
related to an object-realism, asserting objects as the entities on the ontological
level, which possess unique well-defined properties. This object-realism could be
questioned by Quambiguity, as is done in the approaches of structural realism
[Esfeld and Lam, 2008], [Ladyman, 1998b],[Worrall, 1989].
13It is remarkable that Bohmian Mechanics follows the position of moderate structural real-
ism insofar as there are objects on the ontological level but with a lack of intrinsic properties.
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The variety of possible ontologies in the interpretations of Quantum Mechan-
ics gives the impression that the ontological level allows arbitrary ontological
commitments. This impression is wrong; in fact Kochen-Specker Theorem ,
Bell inequalities and others ruled out a whole branch of ontologies that are not
realised in nature [Kochen and Specker, 1975], [Zeilinger, 2002]. This demon-
strates, according to the presented theorem on ontological truth, that there is
indeed progress in the quest for ontological truth[Krizek, 2017a]; nonetheless
there might be no final answer to it.
5 Conclusion
As reality is such an ambiguous conception, we provided an overview on classical
aspects of reality and reality in philosophy of science. We provided definitions
for Bell realism and realism concepts in Quantum Mechanics.
Since the formalism of Quantum Mechanics involves highly non-classical con-
cepts like entanglement, the classical conceptions of reality, like object ontology
with intrinsic properties, fails to represent an appropriate ontological concep-
tion.
We propose that the structural realist approaches in philosophy of science brings
a new perspective into the discussion on the interpretation of Quantum Mechan-
ics. Since the object ontology was a highly successful conception and compatible
with our common sense experiences, it is deeply anchored in our thinking and
our scientific theories. But though it is so well founded in our common sense
experience, object ontology was not a very much successful conception in the
past at all. All assumed objects, turned out to be constructed out of deeper
building blocks and physics never came to a point to really face an object at
all. Atomism showed us the road to these fundamental building blocks of mat-
ter, and Quantum Mechanics set the rules of their behaviour. And if we ask
ourselves, if these fundamental building blocks, these elementary particles, are
objects on the conceptual and ontological level, then we have no good reason to
believe that they are.
The formalism of Quantum Mechanics suggests a modification of our philosoph-
ical conceptions about reality in several possible ways. One conception that we
might have to give up is the ontological conception of objects. Structural re-
alism suggests that what is out there is not an object-like entity that carries
properties; it suggests that what is there is a structure, that can be revealed
by our best scientific theories. With this approach, structural realism on the
one hand complies with the miracle argument of scientific realism, and on the
other hand considers the critique of Pessimistic Meta Induction, in the sense
that our best theories always speak about structure and it is structure that
reflects the ontological elements. By this change of perspective on structures
as the primary ontological relevant entities, structural realism resolves the cri-
tique of Pessimistic Meta Induction. What is left open by the discussions on
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structural realism is the relevance of objects. In that respect, the three po-
sitions of epistemic, ontic and moderate ontic structural realism differ vastly.
Also the interpretations of Quantum Mechanics provide no coherent answer,
but Bohmian mechanics for instance emphasizes objects that carry no intrinsic
properties anymore, only the position of quantum objects is relevant. In the
abandoning of intrinsic properties of objects, Bohmian mechanics agrees with
Copenhagen views, except the position of the quantum system. The position
plays a distinguished role in Bohmian mechanics, this distinguished role reflects
in the formalism of Quantum Mechanics as the position is assigned to a infinite-
dimensional Hilbert space.
The De Broglie-Bohm interpretation emphasizes conceptions like active infor-
mation as something that exists between the entities as a kind of relation or
structure in the sense of structural realism, but not in the sense of an subjective
information like in QBism. Information in the De Broglie-Bohm interpretation
is seen as a formative cause related to the conceptions by Aristotle, and not as
an entity related to knowledge or perception.
In QBism the quantum state represents the belief of a specific agent on the
behaviour of a quantum system; there the structure of structural realism would
be instantiated by the belief of the specific agent. Since the belief of a specific
agent is not an objective quantity it turns out that Quantum Mechanics in the
QBist reading is a mixture of subjective and objective elements. In the light of
the structural realism movement we proposed that QBism suggests to define a
new category of structural realism, doxastic structural realism.
Doxastic structural realism is the position of a structural realism neither in the
sense of ontic structural realism nor epistemic structural realism, adopting the
QBist interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. The position states that there
are agents in the world and their best strategy on decisions of how the world
behaves is described by Quantum Mechanics.
The structures in doxastic structural realism are on the one hand the subjec-
tive beliefs of agents performing Quantum Mechanics, and on the other hand
the objective quantum dimension assigned to the quantum systems and their
interrelations. In the spirit of QBism it is more a participatory realism than a
revelation about what the world really is. There is no world fully independent
of the agent.
The Brukner-Zeilinger interpretation emphasizes information as foundational
entity. The quantum state describes the knowledge of a hypothetical observer
of the specific quantum system. The De Broglie-Bohm interpretation agrees
with the Brukner-Zeilinger interpretation in the sense that information is con-
sidered as foundational, even if the De Broglie-Bohm interpretation understands
it differently than the Brukner-Zeilinger interpretation. QBism and Brukner-
Zeilinger interpretation agree on the nature of information as something related
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to knowledge, perception or belief of observers, although they disagree on the
question if this information is objective or subjective.
Specifically Entanglement turns out to be a key feature that demonstrates this
structural realism in Quantum Mechanics. Entangled particles do not possess
properties in the individuals; what can be assigned instead, are relations between
the entangled particles. The entangled quantum state is the representation of
these relations.
After all, the status of objects in the approaches of structural realism and the
interpretation of Quantum Mechanics remains an open question, but its onto-
logical relevance is strongly damaged. The old and very successful conception
of objects seems to have come to an end. What is out there on the ontological
level is something different.
It remains an open question how it is possible in the framework of structural
realism that these structures lead to such a manifold of feasible interpretations
that are coherent and overlapping in their formalism and empirical predictions,
but orthogonal in their ontological commitments.
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